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Massachusetts Has a Problem: The
Unconstitutionality of the Tax Deed
Ralph D. Clifford

13 U. MASS L. REV. 274
ABSTRACT
The predominant method for collecting delinquent real estate taxes in Massachusetts
is the use of the “tax deed” as authorized by Chapter 60, Sections 53-54. Under the
authorized procedures, each municipality’s tax collector can execute and record a
deed that transfers fee simple title to the real estate to the municipality subject to the
taxpayer’s statutorily created redemption right. If the redemption right is or cannot
be exercised, all of the taxpayer’s rights in the property, as well as other’s rights
created by encumbrances such as mortgages, are terminated by the foreclosure
process provided for in the statute. Importantly, the municipality does not obtain title
to the taxpayer’s land by foreclosure; instead, it merely frees itself of any remaining
claim by the taxpayer.
The problem with the tax deed procedure is that it fails to provide both procedural
and substantive due process to the taxpayer. Procedurally, although adequate notice
is given, title to the taxpayer’s real estate is taken by the government without a
hearing. Based on an unreviewed decision by a municipal tax collector, the taxpayer
immediately loses title to the land. Substantively, by using a tax deed, the
municipality engages in the taking of property without providing reasonable
compensation. The value of the land taken for payment of the tax debt is not
evaluated in the context of the debt owed. Empirical evidence shows that the
property’s value significantly exceeds the debt owed, giving the municipality the
ability to collect almost fifty dollars for every dollar of delinquent real estate tax
owed, on average. Each year, approximately $56,000,000 is unconstitutionally
appropriated from taxpayers. This Article will explore these problems
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I. INTRODUCTION

M

unicipalities must be able to collect overdue real estate taxes
efficiently, but must do so in a constitutional way.
Unfortunately, significant due process problems subsist in the primary
method used to collect these unpaid taxes in Massachusetts.1 This
paper discusses these problems.
Most commonly, a Massachusetts municipality2 uses a “tax deed”
that is executed by the tax collector and recorded on the land records.3
Using this document, the municipal officer transfers title to the land
from the taxpayer to the town, subject to a right to redeem title if the
taxpayer satisfies the tax debt and associated costs.4 If the tax debt is
not paid, Massachusetts law uses strict foreclosure to extinguish the
remaining title held by the taxpayer, known as the right of
redemption.5 The result of this process is that the municipality acquires
title to the land free and clear of all other claims being made against
1

2

3
4
5

See generally MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 60 (2012) (outlining the procedures
available to collect real estate taxes).
As is common throughout the United States, real estate taxes are imposed at the
local level. See Glenn W. Fisher, History of Property Taxes in the United States,
ECON. HIST. ASS’N, https://eh.net/encyclopedia/history-of-property-taxes-in-theunited-states/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2018) [https://perma.cc/Q5Z9-GXUL]. In
Massachusetts, this is the city or town in which the property is located. See
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 59, § 2A (2012) (imposing duties on the “assessor[] of
each city and town”).
See ch. 60, § 54.
See id.
See id. § 53 (“If a tax on land is not paid . . . the collector may take such land for
the town . . . .”). Where a lien holder is given title to the property affected by the
security device rather than having the property sold and taking the money
generated, it is known as a “strict foreclosure.” See, e.g., Wornat Dev. Corp. v.
Vakalis, 529 N.E.2d 1329, 1330 n.4 (Mass. 1988) (“Generally, in a decree of
strict foreclosure of a mortgage, a court determines the amount a defaulting
mortgagor owes and orders the mortgagor to pay this amount to the mortgagee
within a specific time. If the mortgagor fails to make the payment, the decree
extinguishes the mortgagor’s right of redemption and vests title absolutely in the
mortgagee. No sale of the property takes place.” (citations omitted)). In the
minority of states recognizing the remedy, it is generally limited to those
circumstances where a foreclosure by sale is unlikely to generate a financial
return to the fee title holder. Cf. Bradford Realty Corp. v. Beetz, 142 A. 395, 397
(Conn. 1928) (“As no equity in the property over and above the first mortgage
[existed] . . . the trial court wisely refused, in the exercise of its discretion, to
impose upon the plaintiff the additional cost and expense of a foreclosure by
sale.”).
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the property.6 While this process is not fundamentally unsound in
theory, as implemented in Massachusetts, it leads directly to an
unconstitutional taking of property by the municipality. A hypothetical
will illustrate:
Assume a taxpayer owes a small amount of money to
the municipality, say $400.00.7 Also assume that the
real estate has a market value of about $375,000.8 For
whatever reason, the property owner fails to pay the
$400.00 bill.9 Following the procedures described
below, the municipality takes tax title and then
forecloses any redemption rights that the taxpayer may
have had.10 The town now has absolute title to the
property and all of the taxpayer’s rights have been
terminated. In other words, to satisfy a $400.00 debt,
the taxpayer will surrender property worth almost
1,000 times more and the town obtains a windfall of
$374,600.
Of course, as a general matter, the government is not allowed to
appropriate private property without due process of law.11 A failure of
6

7

8

9

10
11

See generally Robert J. Kerwin, Municipal Collection by Foreclosure of Tax
Title, 83 MASS. L. REV. 77 (1998).
This small of a claim is not unusual as unpaid municipal water and utility bills
can be treated as property taxes under Massachusetts law. See MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 164, § 58B & ch. 60, §§ 23, 43 (2012). In the empirical study [hereinafter
“Foreclosure Data”] done as part of this project, the smallest tax debt that was
enforced by a tax deed was $26. This file, 13 TL 147312, resulted in the
foreclosure of the taxpayer’s redemption rights on a property with an assessed
value of $24,100, a ratio of 927 to 1. See Foreclosure Data (available upon
request to the author).
The median price of a single-family house in Massachusetts as of June 30, 2017,
was $375,500.00. Massachusetts Home Prices & Values, ZILLOW,
http://www.zillow.com/ma/home-values/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/A7LU-K9PW].
A common reason for not paying a bill this small is that the property owner has
become incompetent due to age or illness. See, e.g., Tallage LLC v. Meaney,
2015 WL 4207424, at *2, 23 LCR (Landlaw) 375 (Mass. Land Ct. 2015).
See infra Part II.
Two federal constitutional provisions establish due process rights, the Fifth
Amendment for federal actions, see, e.g., Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81
(1971), and the Fourteenth Amendment for state actions, see, e.g., Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693, 710-11 (1976). In Massachusetts, Articles 1, 10, and 12 of the
Declaration of Rights and Part II, ch. 1 of the Constitution provide these rights.
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due process can result from insufficient procedures where either
proper notice is not given or an opportunity to be heard by a neutral
magistrate is not provided.12 A due process deprivation can also occur
when private property is taken without just compensation.13 As this
article will establish, the Massachusetts tax deed procedure fails to
satisfy these requirements. Although the tax deed statute requires
notice to the taxpayer before the taking, it allows the taking to be
effectuated without a hearing. Further, if the municipality subsequently
forecloses the right of redemption, property significantly higher in
value than the tax debt is taken without cause. In summary, of the
three due process requirements—notice, hearing and compensation—
Massachusetts satisfies only the first.
The next section contains a description of the process used to
collect unpaid property taxes. Then, empirical evidence defining the
scope of the problem is presented. The final section compares the
Massachusetts procedure with constitutional norms and finds tax deeds
under Chapter 60 lacking.
II. THE MASSACHUSETTS “TAX DEED” PROCESS
The procedures available for collecting delinquent real estate taxes
owed to the municipality of the locus are set out in Chapter 60 of the
General Laws.14 There are multiple remedies provided including
bringing suit on the debt,15 presenting the claim against the estate of a
deceased taxpayer,16 placing a lien on the property and selling that
lien,17 taking title for nonpayment of taxes,18 and even arresting the

12

13

14

15
16
17
18

See, e.g., Moe v. Sec’y of Admin. & Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387, 390 (Mass. 1981);
Pinnick v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 592, 601 n.8 (Mass. 1971).
See, e.g., Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)
(requiring “that deprivation of . . . property by adjudication be preceded by
notice and opportunity for hearing . . . .”).
See, e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48-49 (1960) (requiring
compensation when property value is destroyed).
See generally MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 60 (2012); see generally DOUGLAS A.
RANDALL & DOUGLAS F. FRANKLIN, Municipal Law and Practice, in 18B
MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE SERIES ch. 37(C) (5th ed. 2006).
See § 35.
See id. § 36.
See id. § 37.
See id. § 53.
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taxpayer.19 The choice of which remedy to pursue is the tax
collector’s; indeed, a tax collector can pursue multiple avenues
simultaneously.20 The most common remedy used—and the subject of
this article—is the process by which the municipality seizes title to the
taxpayer’s land using a tax deed.21
The procedure set forth for a municipality to use a tax deed to take
title for nonpayment of real estate taxes is straightforward. The
relevant statute is Section 53 of Chapter 60, which starts:
If a tax on land is not paid within fourteen days after
demand therefor and remains unpaid at the date of
taking, the collector may take such land for the town,
first giving fourteen days’ notice of his intention to
exercise such power of taking, which notice may be
served in the manner required by law for the service of
subpoenas on witnesses in civil cases or may be
published, and shall conform to the requirements of
section forty. He shall also, fourteen days before the
taking, post a notice so conforming in two or more
convenient and public places.22
In other words, a demand for payment of the outstanding taxes
must be made, fourteen days must pass, formal notice that a taking will
occur must be served,23 and then fourteen days later the “collector may
take such land for the town.”24
It is important to recognize that the municipality is not asserting a
security device under Section 53; instead, title to the property is taken
outright and the former title holder’s interest (most commonly a fee

19
20

21

22
23

24

See id. § 29.
See Forbes & Wallace, Inc. v. City of Springfield, 486 N.E.2d 1134, 1137
(Mass. App. Ct. 1985) (“The remedies for the collection of a real estate tax are
cumulative.”).
William P. Cowin & Daniel C. Hill, Tax Title Sales & Tax Title Issues, MASS.
COLLECTORS
&
TREASURERS
SCHOOL
3
(Aug.
13,
2015),
http://mcta.virtualtownhall.net/pages/MCTA_AnnualSchool/required/Course1006-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/53QY-6F52].
§ 53.
See generally Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983)
(noting that the standards for service apply and individualized notice must be
used whenever possible).
§ 53; see generally RANDALL & FRANKLIN, supra note 14, at § 37.40.
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simple absolute) is reduced to a right of redemption.25 The town can
take “immediate possession” of the property.26 If the taxpayer seeks to
regain possession, a suit can be brought in equity, but the full burden
of proof is placed on the title holder.27 The town is not liable for any
damages that occur during the town’s possession of the land.28 If the
property generates any rents or other income, the town may keep the
money.29 Based on the statute’s words and its effect, the government
has taken almost complete title from the former property owner.
Significantly, there will have been no hearing held by a magistrate to
determine the validity of the taking. The signature of the
municipality’s tax collector is factually conclusive and immediately
deprives the property owner of any interest.30
Although title has transferred to the municipality, the taxpayer, as
the former title holder, maintains a right of redemption.31 This right
survives until such time as the Massachusetts Land Court32 enters a
judgment foreclosing it.33 Until foreclosed, the taxpayer can redeem
the property by paying the outstanding delinquent tax, at an interest
rate of sixteen percent, and all charges lawfully added.34 As part of the
judgment, the Land Court may add attorney’s fees if the taxpayer can
afford to pay them.35 If not redeemed, however, because title to the
land was taken without regards for the amount of taxes owed, the
foreclosure gives the municipality the full value of the real estate and
the taxpayer is left with nothing.
25

26
27

28
29
30

31
32
33
34
35

See § 53; RANDALL & FRANKLIN, supra note 14, at § 37.40 (“Title to the land
taken will vest in the city or town, subject to the right of redemption . . . .”).
§ 53.
Id. The statute only references regaining possession; regaining title is discussed
below.
Id.
Id.
See id. (“[T]he collector may take such land for the town . . . .”); see also id.
§ 54 (“The instrument of taking shall be under the hand and seal of the
collector . . . .”). The job duties of a tax collector are set forth in Section 2 of
Chapter 60. There are no job qualifications statutorily imposed, leaving each
municipality to hire whomever it wishes to serve in the job. See id. § 2.
See id. § 62.
Id. § 76 (giving exclusive jurisdiction over redemption to the Land Court).
See id. § 62.
Id.
Id. § 65.

2018

The Unconstitutionality of the Tax Deed

281

After foreclosure, the municipality’s title is absolute and the
judgment forever bar[s] future attempts to redeem the property.36 In
reality, however, for the first year after the foreclosure judgment is
entered, it can be vacated by the Court.37 The statute does not
enunciate the grounds that must be satisfied for a court to do so,38 but
the Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) has indicated that “[t]he granting
of the petition to vacate . . . rest[s] largely but not entirely in the
discretion of the trial judge [and s]uch petitions are extraordinary in
nature and ought to be granted only after careful consideration and in
instances where they are required to accomplish justice.”39
In summary, to recover delinquent taxes, the municipality takes the
land without a hearing. No court or judicial officer determines if the
municipality’s claim of a tax deficiency is accurate before the property
is taken. Subsequently, should the taxpayer not redeem the property,
its full value becomes the property of the town. The taxpayer cannot
claim the difference between the amount that is owed and the amount
that was taken. As the next section demonstrates, this difference is not
small.

36
37
38

39

Id. § 64.
Id. § 69A.
Section 69A is written as a statute of limitations indicating when the right to
bring a petition ends rather than as a section defining the right. See id.; Town of
Easton v. Sprague & Reynolds Co., TL Case No. 91984, 7 LCR (Landlaw) 96
(Mass. Land Ct. 1999). Despite this limit, where the challenge is raised on due
process grounds, the courts have recognized an exception and allowed the
challenge after the deadline passes. See, e.g., Town of Barnstable v. Unknown
Owners, 2004 WL 2191215 at *5, 12 LCR (Landlaw) 390 (Mass. Land Ct.
2004).
Lynch v. City of Boston, 48 N.E.2d 26, 27 (Mass. 1943). There are not many
cases where this section has been used. A search of the Landlaw’s LAND COURT
REPORTER online case searching service, http://www.landlaw.com (fee based),
returned 16 occasions that the Land Court, which has exclusive jurisdiction over
tax foreclosures and redemptions, considered the section since 1993. Several
cases where the Land Court did allow a redemption under Section 69A generally
involved due process notice problems that had not been discovered before the
judgment was entered; see, e.g., Town of Russell v. Barlow, 2016 WL 3745960,
24 LCR (Landlaw) 404 (Mass. Land Ct. 2016); Others involved extreme health
challenges faced by the former title holder that caused them to default; see, e.g.,
Tallage LLC v. Meaney, 2015 WL 4207424, 23 LCR (Landlaw) 375 (Mass.
Land Ct. 2015).

282

UMass Law Review

v. 13 | 274

III. THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM: HOW MUCH PROPERTY IS BEING
TAKEN?
To determine the scope of the problem, a small empirical study
was undertaken based on the public records of the Massachusetts Land
Court.40 The Foreclosure Data comprises information from the files
that are associated with every foreclosure that follows the tax taking.
The data from one typical year41 are included; those redemption
foreclosures filed on or after August 1, 2013 and on or before July 31,
2014. This period was chosen to make the data set reflective of the
current status of the foreclosure system based on a period where most
of the suits associated with the tax taking were concluded with a final
judgment so that complete data would be available.42 Because the
number of foreclosures filed within the year was larger than could be
practically processed,43 a random sample of just over five percent of
these files were included in the Foreclosure Data. Overall, 114 files
from the year were examined and detailed information about each case
was extracted to build the database.44
With the Foreclosure Data built, the scope of the problem being
discussed in this article became apparent. For the year, Massachusetts
municipalities collected approximately $56,600,000 more from their
40

41

42

43

44

The Land Court has exclusive jurisdiction in Massachusetts to foreclose the
right of redemption that follows a tax taking. See § 64. Its foreclosure records,
therefore, are comprehensive of all tax titles that entered the court system for the
termination of the right of redemption. Id.
Interview with Deborah J. Patterson, Land Court Recorder (Feb. 20, 2017)
(stating that the tax foreclosures that occurred in the test period were typical for
what the Land Court normally processes). The Recorder is the judicial officer
within the Land Court who is responsible for hearing tax foreclosure and
redemption matters. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 185, § 6 (2012).
This was largely successful as 78.1% of the files in the sample had concluded.
See Foreclosure Data, supra note 7.
There were approximately 2,260 files within the year. This number was obtained
by processing the docket numbers used by the Court, which are assigned
sequentially. Consequently, the docket number of the last case in the year less
the docket number of the first case gives the numbers of files opened. Because it
is possible, though extremely unlikely, that a docket number was missed, there
could be slightly fewer files than this. The files are on paper. Each docket
number has a separate file folder that is available from the Land Court’s Clerk’s
Office by that number. Processing each file to extract the data needed for this
limited study took five to fifteen minutes each, excluding the time it would take
for the Clerk to retrieve each file. Id.
Id.
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taxpayers than was owed. In other words, the towns and cities
collected $42.87 for every dollar they were owed. The details follow.
The average size of the tax lien being collected was $4,177 with a
range from a low of $26 to a high of $66,642. The assessed property
value45 averaged $258,462 with a range from $1,300 to $2,295,100.
On average, the tax lien represented 1.62% of the assessed value of the
property, with a range from 0.05% to 48.87% of the assessed value.
Because a random sample of cases was used, an estimate of the overall
value can be calculated.46 Thus, the taxes claimed in foreclosure cases
during the year studied were approximately $9,439,000 against an
assessed value of $584,125,000.47
However, not every claim filed resulted in a foreclosure. Only
15.79% of the foreclosure suits resulted in a judgment for the
municipality.48 The overall estimated assessed value of those matters
45

46

47

48

Massachusetts law requires assessments at “fair cash valuation.” MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 59, § 38 (1979); see Tremont & Suffolk Mills v. City of Lowell, 39
N.E. 1028, 1029 (Mass. 1895) (describing how to determine value by estimating
current market valuation); Bennett v. Bd. of Assessors of Whitman, 237 N.E.2d
7, 9 (Mass. 1968) (finding that assessing tax “at less than 100% of full fair cash
value” was illegal); see generally RANDALL & FRANKLIN, supra note 14, at
§ 36.24. Reassessments are done annually. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 59,
§ 2A(a) (2008) (“The assessors of each city and town shall determine the fair
cash valuation of . . . real property . . . on the first day of January of each year.”).
Consequently, as a matter of law, the appraised value should serve as a fair
estimate of the actual market value of the property. If it does not, then the
amount demanded as taxes is also incorrect.
The 114 files examined were 5.04% of the total files, so multiplying the values
determined in the random sample by the inverse of .0504—19.84—will give an
approximation of the size of the data element within the entire sample set. See
Estimating the Population Mean Using a Random Sample (Sept. 8, 2003),
http://www.stat.wmich.edu/s216/book/node75.html
[https://perma.cc/B4VW5ZM5].
Utilizing the formulae in Estimating the Population, the standard error figures
calculated for these two approximations are $760 and $29,375 respectively. The
standard error measures the chances that the estimate is incorrect because only a
random sample was used. It is calculated by dividing how internally consistent
the data in the sample was (the standard deviation of the data) by the sampling
size used to create the data set. See id. If the data set has little internal variation,
its standard deviation will be low leading to a small estimated error. Likewise, a
larger sample size will decrease the chance of error as the data used is more
likely to be typical of the data within the data set.
Almost twenty-two percent of the cases in the Foreclosure Data were not
resolved at the time the study was concluded (February 17, 2017). See
Foreclosure Data, supra note 7. The rest of the cases were resolved by the
municipality withdrawing the complaint—usually an indication that the
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that did foreclose was $57,963,000. These properties were taken to pay
an outstanding tax liability of $1,352,000, a difference of $56,611,000
in excess recovery for the towns in the year.
To summarize, based on an examination of a typical year, the data
show that Massachusetts municipalities are receiving almost $43.00
for each dollar owed by taking tax title to recover delinquent taxes. It
is no wonder why taking tax title is the remedy of choice.
Unfortunately, it is a remedy that fails to pass constitutional muster for
two reasons as the next section discusses.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES
There are two major constitutional problems with the
Massachusetts tax deed under Section 53.49 First, the procedure results
in the municipalities taking far more of the taxpayers’ property than is
necessary to pay the debt owed, resulting in a taking of property
without just compensation. Second, the procedure fails to satisfy
procedural due process because a hearing is not provided on a timely
basis. Each problem is discussed in turn.
A. By Keeping More Than Is Owed, a Tax Deed Takes the
Property of the Taxpayer Without Providing Adequate
Compensation
1. As a Violation of the Federal Constitution
The Supreme Court has only directly visited the issue of a
government entity keeping the excess proceeds from a tax seizure
twice.50 The first case, United States v. Lawton, was decided in 1884.51
In Lawton, the United States “purchased” land being sold for a tax

49
50

51

delinquent taxes and collection expenses had been paid or the matter has
otherwise been settled.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 60, § 53 (2012).
The issue was also indirectly referenced in Chapman v. Zobelein. See Chapman
v. Zobelein, 237 U.S. 135 (1915). There, the taking issue was not presented to
the Court as the plaintiff was seeking to have a conveyance to a third party
cancelled eight years after tax title was taken and more than three years after the
title was conveyed to the defendant. See id. at 137-38. Chapman, therefore, was
not a challenge to the taking by the state, it was a challenge to the subsequent
disposal of the property by the state. See id. at 139 (“this is a bill attacking the
title of the purchaser who bought at the second sale . . . .”). Whatever rights the
plaintiff had to the surplus property had been surrendered by his failure to use
the procedures provided to him by California law. See id. at 137-38.
United States v. Lawton, 110 U.S. 146 (1884).
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deficiency for a stated value of $1,100.00 even though the taxpayer
only owed $170.50 in taxes and associated costs.52 The taxpayer’s
estate demanded the surplus, but the government refused – Lawton
clearly establishes that such retention is inappropriate:
To withhold the surplus from the owner would be to
violate the [F]ifth [A]mendment to the [C]onstitution,
and deprive him of his property without due process of
law or take his property for public use without just
compensation. If he affirms the propriety of selling or
taking more than enough of his land to pay the tax and
penalty and interest and costs, and applies for the
surplus money, he must receive at least that.53
The issue was revisited in Nelson v. City of New York.54 As in
Lawton, a government entity, this time the City of New York, took two
parcels of real estate that had far more value than the amounts owed.55
The taxpayer defaulted on both seizures and was denied any of the
excess proceeds obtained.56 The Supreme Court upheld the
government’s right to keep the proceeds, but in a manner that did not
contradict the holding in Lawton:
[W]e do not have here a statute which absolutely
precludes an owner from obtaining the surplus
proceeds of a judicial sale. In City of New York v.
Chapman Docks Co., 149 N.Y.S.2d 679 (App. Div.
1956), an owner filed a timely answer in a foreclosure
proceeding, asserting his property had a value
substantially exceeding the tax due. The Appellate
Division construed . . . the statute to mean that upon
proof of this allegation a separate sale should be
directed so that the owner might receive the surplus.57
Nelson recognizes, therefore, that a taxpayer can procedurally
waive a claim to the excess valuation as long as—and this is a critical
52

53
54
55

56
57

See id. at 149. The U.S. did not pay the purchase price; instead, it kept the land
at the $1,100.00 value. Id.
Id. at 150.
Nelson v. City of New York, 352 U.S. 103 (1956).
See id. at 105-06 (finding one parcel valued at $6,000 was taken for a $65.00
charge; another parcel valued at $46,000 was taken for a $814.50 charge).
See id.
Id. at 110 (footnote omitted).
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requirement—such a claim can be made at some point in the
proceedings. Consequently, both Lawton and Nelson stand for the
proposition that any surplus property taken must be returned to the
taxpayer upon an appropriately made demand.
Nelson was decided in 1956.58 Although there has not been
additional litigation in this area in the Supreme Court,59 Lawton and
Nelson have been considered more recently in a few lower federal
court and state court decisions. An examination of two of the federal
cases will highlight the debate that has recently developed about the
meaning of Lawton and Nelson and will show the continuing viability
of the doctrine announced in Lawton.60
A few years ago, the district court in D.C. agreed with the
interpretation of Lawton and Nelson and found the holdings consistent,
continuing the viability of Lawton. The district court stated in
Coleman:
This Court draws two clear principles from the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Lawton and Nelson.
Nelson makes clear that a Takings Clause violation
regarding the retention of equity will not arise when a
58
59

60

See id. at 103.
The only Supreme Court case that cites to Nelson is Mennonite Board of
Missions, which addressed providing notice of a foreclosure, not the distribution
of excess proceeds from one. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S.
791, 799 (1983). Lawton has not been cited by the Supreme Court since the
Nelson decision.
A detailed discussion of the state cases does not add to the discussion as the
differences in interpretation are adequately presented by the two federal district
court opinions. The principal state cases that require the excess to be available to
the taxpayer include: Bogie v. Town of Barnet, 270 A.2d 898, 903 (Vt. 1970);
City of Anchorage v. Thomas, 624 P.2d 271, 274 (Alaska 1981); & Thomas
Tool Servs., Inc. v. Town of Croydon, 761 A.2d 439, 441 (N.H. 2000)
(discussing the state constitution). The state cases not finding such a requirement
include: City of Auburn v. Mandarelli, 320 A.2d 22, 32 (Me. 1974) & Ritter v.
Ross, 558 N.W.2d 909, 910 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996). Another federal case is
Balthazar v. Mari Limited, 301 F. Supp. 103, 105 (N.D. Ill. 1969), aff’d per
curiam, 396 U.S. 114 (1969) (finding no due process problem as excess was
available to taxpayer).
The Supreme Judicial Court has considered the statute that is the subject of
this article. See Kelly v. City of Boston, 204 N.E.2d 123 (Mass. 1965). The SJC
determined that the statute reserves the excess value from the tax taking to the
municipality. See id. at 125. Apparently, no constitutional challenge was raised
by the parties to the statute and the SJC made no constitutional ruling in the
case. See id. at 123–26.
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tax-sale statute provides an avenue for recovery of the
surplus equity. Lawton makes clear that a Takings
Clause violation will arise when a tax-sale statute
grants a former owner an independent property interest
in the surplus equity and the government fails to return
that surplus. The question [the current] case presents
is: What if the tax-sale statute does not provide a right
to the surplus and the statute provides no avenue for
recovery of any surplus? A property interest in equity
could conceivably be created by some other legal
source. In that circumstance, failure to provide an
avenue for recovery of the equity would appear to
produce a result identical to Lawton: Property to which
an individual is legally entitled has been taken without
recourse.61
In summary, the Coleman court recognized that once a state
recognizes a property interest in the taxpayer, it cannot summarily
remove that interest. Under this logic, a Massachusetts delinquent
taxpayer has a full ownership interest in the land before the tax deed is
used, so making that interest simply disappear deprives the taxpayer of
that interest, which Lawton prohibits.62
The view that Lawton has continuing viability is not unanimous as
the District of Oregon found the opposite in Reinmiller v. Marion

61

62

Coleman v. D.C., 70 F. Supp. 3d 58, 80 (D.D.C. 2014) (footnote and citations
omitted).
Cf. Langlois v. Langlois, 93 N.E.2d 264, 265 (Mass. 1950) (finding that
limitations on the use of the financial value of a property was inconsistent with
holding fee simple in it). For the analysis of a taking, the property owner’s entire
interest is considered. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978) (“‘Taking’ jurisprudence does not divide a single
parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a
particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a
particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses . . . on
the . . . parcel as a whole . . . .”); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 326–27 (2002) (same); Concrete Pipe & Prods.
v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr., 508 U.S. 602, 644 (1993) (“[A] claimant’s
parcel of property [sh]ould not first be divided into what was taken and what
was left for the purpose of demonstrating the taking of the former to be complete
and hence compensable. To the extent that any portion of property is taken, that
portion is always taken in its entirety; the relevant question, however, is whether
the property taken is all, or only a portion of, the parcel in question.”).
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Cty.63 When the decision is examined, however, its weakness becomes
apparent. According to the Reinmiller court, a state is apparently free
to impose any system of taxation it wishes.64 Even if you accept the
court’s statement that the “States have a very wide discretion”65 to
design its system of taxation, this cannot imply that such systems are
free from constitutional scrutiny.66 As a farfetched example, could a
state only tax a racial or religious minority on the basis of membership
in that group?67 If, as is clearly the case in this example, the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the
structure and functioning of a taxing system, its Due Process Clause
must likewise apply.
After indicating that constitutional limits might not be relevant in
any case, Reinmiller nevertheless limited Nelson to only requiring
63

64

65

66

67

See Reinmiller v. Marion Cty., No. 05-1926-PK, 2006 WL 2987707 (D. Or. Oct.
16, 2006).
See Reinmiller, 2006 WL 2987707, at *3 (analyzing the validity of the due
process claim being made with the statement, “The law is well-settled that ‘[t]he
States have a very wide discretion in the laying of their taxes.’” Weissinger v.
White, 733 F.2d 802, 805–06 (11th Cir. 1984), quoting Allied Stores v. Bowers,
358 U.S. 522, 526 (1959)). Of course, the Weissinger case relied upon by
Reinmiller continued, “To protect the states’ fundamental taxing authority,
federal equal protection challenges to state tax laws are reviewed with a
minimal level of scrutiny.” Weissinger, 733 F.2d at 806 (emphasis added). The
case before the court in Reinmiller was not an equal protection claim.
Reinmiller, 2006 WL 2987707, at *3 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
See id. (“Federal courts have not been willing to disturb state tax laws and find
constitutional violations.”). The Reinmiller Court ultimately dismissed the action
“with prejudice.” Id. at *4. Reinmiller may have been correct that, as a matter of
comity, the federal courts will not review the constitutionality of a state taxation
statute, particularly on equal protections grounds, but significantly, this imposes
no limitation of the evaluation of constitutionality in the state court, a process
that must be available for the abstention to apply. See Fair Assessment in Real
Estate Ass’n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 116 (1981) (“we hold that taxpayers are
barred by the principle of comity from asserting § 1983 actions against the
validity of state tax systems in federal courts. Such taxpayers must seek
protection of their federal rights by state remedies, provided of course that those
remedies are plain, adequate, and complete, and may ultimately seek review of
the state decisions in this Court.” (emphasis added)). The Reinmiller Court may
have been right to dismiss the case as it belonged in state court under an
abstention doctrine, but it completely lacked the authority to deny the plaintiff
an opportunity to have a state court review the constitutionality of the provision
as its dismissal with prejudice attempts to do. See Levin v. Commerce Energy,
560 U.S. 413, 421–22 (2010) (discussing comity).
See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
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procedural due process.68 To support this, the Reinmiller court quoted
a final part of the Nelson discussion of the substantive issue,
specifically “nothing in the Federal Constitution prevents this where
the record shows adequate steps were taken to notify the owners of the
charges due and the foreclosure proceedings.”69 However, the
highlighted “this” in the quoted sentence from Nelson, refers to the
previous sentence of the opinion which qualified the reason that no
constitutional violation had been found by using the clause, “in the
absence of timely action to redeem or to recovery any surplus . . . .”70
Therefore, Nelson says that the procedural due process that was
provided was adequate specifically because the taxpayer had failed to
seek a recovery of the surplus through the method that was provided
by the law.71 Consequently, this does not mean that the constitutional
requirements found in Lawton no longer existed or that a state needs to
provide no more than procedural due process.
Finally, the Reinmiller Court attempted to dismiss the Lawton
constitutional holding as being dicta in a purely statutory construction
case.72 This is simply not true. The Supreme Court was using an
argumentum ad absurdum to construe the Lawton statute.73 The
absurdity it established was that the alternate interpretation proposed
for the statute – the taxpayer is not entitled to the surplus – would
cause the statute to be unconstitutional.74 Thus, the argument’s
substance on constitutionality was not only necessary for the decision,
it was critical as without the argument, the Court would not have been
able to construe the statute at bar. The argument is holding, not dicta.75
Of the two district court cases on point, therefore, only Coleman, is
sound. As Coleman recognized, the constitutional limitation created by
Lawton retains viability. This conclusion is reinforced by the Supreme
68
69

70
71
72
73
74
75

See Reinmiller, 2006 WL 2987707, at *3.
Id. (quoting Nelson v. City of New York, 352 U.S. 103, 110 (1956)) (emphasis
added).
Nelson v. City of New York, 352 U.S. 103, 110 (1956).
See id.
See Reinmiller, 2006 WL 2987707, at *3.
See United States v. Lawton, 110 U.S. 146, 150 (1884).
See id.
See Obiter Dictum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (“[a] judicial
comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary
to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential.”); see generally
Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953
(2005).
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Court’s most recent discussion of takings in 2017, Nelson v.
Colorado.76
Colorado is not a tax foreclosure case; instead, it addresses
whether a state is required to refund money collected pursuant to a
criminal conviction if that conviction is later permanently overturned
on appeal.77 In one of the two consolidated cases, the defendant had
been convicted, was fined over $8,000.00, saw the conviction
overturned on appeal, and was ultimately acquitted in the subsequent
retrial.78 In the other case, the fine was over $4,000.00, the convictions
were also struck down, and the state elected not to retry the defendant
after appeal.79 In both cases, despite having been judicially exonerated,
the state refused to return all of the money that had been paid by or
collected from the defendants to pay the fines and associated court
costs.80
The Supreme Court used the three-part Mathews v. Eldridge81 due
process test to require the state to refund the full amount collected.82
As described by the Court in Colorado, the three parts are, “(A) the
private interest affected; (B) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that
interest through the procedures used; and (C) the governmental interest
at stake.”83 Consequently, each of these factors will be briefly
described and then compared to the Massachusetts tax deed procedures
in dealing with the failure to return the excess value of the property
seized to the taxpayer.
For the first factor – the private interest affected – the Court stated,
“[the state] may not retain funds taken from [the defendants] solely
because of their now-invalidated convictions, for [the state] may not
presume a person, adjudged guilty of no crime, nonetheless guilty
enough for monetary exactions.”84 Thus, and similar to the excess
proceeds kept following the use of a Massachusetts tax deed, the
government had no articulable title to the money taken after the
76
77
78
79
80

81
82
83
84

See Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249 (2017).
See id. at 1252.
See id. at 1252–53.
See id. at 1253.
See id. at 1253–54. One defendant was denied any refund; the other was only
given a partial refund. See id.
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
See Colorado, 137 Sup. Ct. at 1252.
Id. at 1255.
See id. at 1256.

2018

The Unconstitutionality of the Tax Deed

291

convictions were voided in Colorado and has no claim to the excess
property seized from the delinquent taxpayer here. For tax deeds, this
first factor weighs against constitutionality.
For the second factor – the risk of erroneous deprivation – the risk
is higher for a tax deed taking than it was for the two exonerated
criminal defendants. The defendants in Colorado could obtain the
return of their property, but were subject to a high evidentiary burden
to do so.85 Requiring any trial, much less one with a high burden of
proof, raised too great of a risk of an incorrect result as the defendants
were presumed innocent.86 Further, the Court noted that one
exonerated from a misdemeanor charge had no remedy as Colorado
law did not allow them to claim a refund.87 The Massachusetts tax
deed procedure for returning the excess property to the taxpayer is as
extreme as Colorado’s treatment of misdemeanors as no recovery is
available. There is a 100% chance that the taxpayer’s property will not
be returned.88 Again, for tax deeds, this factor weighs against
constitutionality.
For the final factor – the government interest at stake – an easier
evaluation occurred as the Colorado Court could find no such
interest.89 This analysis applies with equal force to the Massachusetts
tax deed process as a municipality has no interest in the money beyond
that necessary to pay the taxes owed with the associated costs of
collection. Once again, the statute is unsustainable.
Consequently, although Colorado derives from criminal cases, its
analysis of due process teaches much about the Massachusetts statute
allowing municipalities to appropriate the excess valuation following a
tax deed seizure. It shows that all three of the Mathews v. Eldridge
factors disfavor the tax deed procedure. This leads directly to the
conclusion that tax deeds violate the Due Process Clause.
Whether the analysis is performed under Lawton or Colorado, the
result is the same. A municipality that does not return the excess
85

86
87

88
89

See id. (requiring the defendant to prove innocence based on clear and
convincing evidence).
See id. at 1257.
See id. The Court also took note of the costs of litigation as a factor standing
against the state’s position. See id.
See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
See Colorado, 137 Sup. Ct. at 1257 (“Colorado has no interest in withholding
from Nelson and Madden money to which the State currently has zero claim of
right.”).
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property to the taxpayer engages in a taking in violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
2. As a Violation of the Massachusetts Constitution
The Massachusetts Constitution has its own provisions that
guarantee due process: Articles 1, 10, and 12 of the Declaration of
Rights and Part II, ch. 1 of the Constitution.90 The analysis under the
Massachusetts Constitution starts with the same analysis that is
presented elsewhere in this article, as a violation of the federal due
process clause would also constitute a violation of the state
constitutional right.91 Consequently, the Massachusetts tax deed would
violate both procedural and substantive due process as discussed.92 It
is important to recognize, however, the federal right is the minimum
protection provided.93 The Massachusetts due process right can go
farther; indeed, for taxation, it does.
A well-established requirement of the Massachusetts Constitution
is a requirement of taxation equality. “[The Massachusetts Due
Process Right] forbid[s] the imposition upon one taxpayer of a burden
relatively greater or relatively less than that imposed upon other
taxpayers.”94 Requiring a delinquent taxpayer to surrender all of the
value of the taxpayer’s real estate would appear to do this. Unlike
“regular” taxpayers, the delinquent ones would be required to pay a tax
many times higher than all others in the municipality. Based on the
averages found in the empirical study reported above, rather than
paying $4,177 as others would, the delinquent taxpayer would pay
$258,462, an amount almost sixty-two times higher.95

90

91

92

93
94

95

See, e.g., Moe v. Sec’y of Admin. & Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387, 390 (Mass. 1981);
Pinnick v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 592, 601 n.8 (Mass. 1971).
See, e.g., Lowell Gas Co. v. Dep’t of Pub. Util., 84 N.E.2d 811, 816 (Mass.
1949) (“The Constitution of this Commonwealth contains safeguards against
deprivation of property without due process of law at least as strong as those of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
See infra Section IV.B (discussing procedural due process violations); see supra
Section IV.A.1 (discussing substantive due process violations).
See Lowell Gas, 84 N.E.2d at 816.
In re Opinion of the Justices, 126 N.E.2d 795, 800 (Mass. 1955); accord
Bettigole v. Assessors of Springfield, 178 N.E.2d 10, 14 (Mass. 1961) (applying
Opinion of the Justices).
See Foreclosure Data, supra note 7 at C3 & D3.
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The SJC has been very strict in its interpretation of this provision.
For example, the SJC disapproved a proposal to allow the towns to use
estimated rather than actual tax bills.96 As the court stated:
Under the proposed [section] the estimated tax bill is to
be precisely the amount of one fourth of the tax
assessed the preceding year under § 57. There is to be
no new assessment. In consequence, no attention is to
be given to changes in valuation during the preceding
year. This means that the destruction of buildings or the
erection of new ones prior to January 1 of the current
year cannot be taken into account. Assessments of less,
or more, than 100% of full fair cash value in some
cases necessarily would be the basis upon which the
taxes would be computed. The estimated taxes, which
would not be proportional, would violate Part II, ch. 1,
§ 1, art. 4, of the Constitution of the Commonwealth
which empowers the General Court “to impose and
levy proportional and reasonable assessments, rates
and taxes, upon all the inhabitants of, and persons
resident, and estates lying, within the said
Commonwealth.”97
Similarly, the court ruled against an exemption of $5,000 that was
to be given to owner-occupiers of residential property as an income tax
credit.98 According to the court, this provision would violate taxation
equality as someone who rented the real estate would not receive it,
thus establishing a difference.99
If a $5,000 tax exemption is sufficient to trigger a tax equality
problem—an amount that would only change someone’s tax by
$255100—a difference of several hundred thousand dollars must
likewise be problematic. Massachusetts tax deeds violate the state
constitutional requisite of tax equality.
96
97
98
99
100

Opinion of the Justices, 249 N.E.2d 23 (Mass. 1969).
Id. at 24 (citation omitted).
Opinion of the Justices, 181 N.E.2d 793 (Mass. 1962).
See id. at 795.
Massachusetts current income tax rate is 5.1%; 5.1% of $5,000 is $255.
2017
Personal
Income
Tax
Changes,
MASS.GOV,
https://www.mass.gov/guides/2017-personal-income-tax-changes (last visited
Feb. 22, 2018) [https://perma.cc/CG2P-5AN6].
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B. Procedural Due Process and the Tax Deed
1. Normally, a Hearing Must Be Provided Before Property Is
Taken
It is axiomatic that state “deprivation[s] of . . . property by
adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing . . .
.”101 As the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held, a deprivation of
property requires its owner to be given “some kind of notice and
afforded some kind of hearing.”102 Almost always, the notice and
hearing must precede the deprivation,103 but there are two recognized
exceptions. First, if “the potential length or severity of the deprivation
does not indicate a likelihood of serious loss and . . . the procedures
underlying the decision to act are sufficiently reliable to minimize the
risk of erroneous determination, government may act without
providing additional advance procedural safeguards.”104 Second, the
existence of “an exigent circumstance permit[s] postponing any notice
or hearing until after the [taking] is effected.”105
When the Massachusetts statutory procedure using tax deeds is
examined under these standards, it fails. Although the pre-seizure
notice provided to the taxpayer seems adequate,106 there is no hearing
101

102

103
104

105
106

Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (emphasis
added).
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975); see also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67, 83-84 (1972); Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127-28 (1990); Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v.
Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 19 (1978).
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313.
Memphis Light, 436 U.S. at 19 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 16 (1991).
The notice requirements of the Due Process Clause appear to be satisfied by the
tax deed process. Before the property can be taken by tax deed, the tax collector
must give notice to the taxpayer by individualized service as would be done for
the service of a witness subpoena. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 60, § 53 (2012).
This requires service in hand, by exposition, or by abode. MASS. R. CIV. P.
45(c). Additionally, section 53 requires that the notice of intent to take the
property be posted in two public places. See § 53.
If the taxes remain unpaid fourteen days after the notice is given, the deed
taking title can be recorded. See § 53. If an action to foreclose the redemption
period is brought, the normal rules for commencing a civil action in
Massachusetts are followed. See MASS. R. CIV. P. 4. All of this is reasonably
designed to give actual notice to an interested party where his or her identity and
location are known and to provide generalized notice to others who are either
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provided before the property is taken (nor immediately afterwards). As
neither of the two recognized exceptions to a pre-seizure hearing
applies, Massachusetts tax deeds cause a procedural due process
violation.
Under Section 53, the town’s tax collector can “take such land”
after providing notice, but without a hearing.107 No pre-taking hearing
is required or even available.108 This leaves the taxpayer without title
to his or her property for a substantial period of time.109 As the
Supreme Court held in Mullane, however, a hearing must, in general,
occur before the taking.110 Thus, the basic requirement of the Due
Process Clause that a property owner be given a hearing before that
property is taken has failed.111 Consequently, unless one or both of the
two exceptions that allow a hearing to occur after the seizure are
satisfied, the Massachusetts tax deed process fails constitutional
muster.

107
108

109

110
111

unknown or known without location. See Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams,
462 U.S. 791 (1983).
See § 53.
See id. Apparently, no taxpayer has challenged the lack of a pre-seizure hearing
in Land Court. See Interview with Deborah J. Patterson, supra note 41. Most
taxpayers assert their redemption rights as pro se litigants. See id.; see also
Foreclosure Data, supra note 7 (showing 6.1% of taxpayers represented by
attorneys). As such, they may be unaware of the larger constitutional problem.
See infra Part II. The empirical study that was done as part of this article was
concluded on February 17, 2017. It examined data from files opened between
August 1, 2013 and July 31, 2014. For the majority of these files (78.1%), it
took the court just over a year on average (398 days) to conclude the case. Of
course, 21.9% of the files were still unresolved in February of 2017. For these
files, the taxpayer’s title was appropriated for a period of at least 2.5 to 3.5
years. None of these times include the period from when the tax deed was
executed and recorded to the time of filing of the foreclosure suit. It seems fair
to conclude from the data that the average taxpayer against whom a tax deed is
executed loses title to the property for at least a year and a half. See Foreclosure
Data, supra note 7.
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
Importantly, no post-seizure hearing is provided by the statute unless the
municipality decides to foreclose the taxpayer’s right of redemption or unless
the taxpayer brings a suit in equity to recover the property taken from him.
Massachusetts’s equity jurisdiction is somewhat guarded but seems broad
enough to include this kind of claim, for example in Bernbaum v. Town of
Nantucket, 646 N.E.2d 739, 740 (Mass. 1995), particularly where constitutional
rights are invoked. See Bettigole v. Assessors of Springfield, 178 N.E.2d 10, 17
(Mass. 1961).
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2. Exception One Fails: Weighing the Seriousness of the
Deprivation and Likelihood of Mistake
The first exception has two parts. The necessity of a pre-seizure
hearing is excused where the deprivation is not likely to be serious and
the pre-seizure decision-making is reliable and unlikely to be
erroneous.112 The Court’s use of the conjunction “and” indicates that
both requisites must be met.113 For Massachusetts tax deeds, neither is.
i. First Infirmity: Taking Title from the Taxpayer Is a
Serious Deprivation of Property Rights
The “seriousness” of the loss created by Section 53 is enormous.
The tax collector is not taking some form of security in the taxpayer’s
property; instead, title is taken.114 After the tax deed is executed and
recorded, the municipality owns the real estate, subject only to a right
of redemption that provides the possibility that the taxpayer can
reclaim title in the future.115 Most aspects of property ownership
transfer to the municipality immediately, including the rights of
possession and profit.116 Under Section 53, a taxpayer can be notified
of a claimed deficiency, and fourteen days later be disposed of almost
all aspects of title and possession except a limited right of redemption.
All of this would be done without a hearing. Upon petition, the
taxpayer can be put back into possession of the property,117 but still
would not have title to the real estate. Further, the taxpayer could have
the right of possession blocked for a significant period of time as the
112
113

114

115
116

117

See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 19 (1978).
See id.; see also Gallagher v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 305 F.3d 264, 270
(4th Cir. 2002) (finding that “each and every” meant “all”); McCormick v. Dep’t
of A. F., 307 F.3d 1339, 1341-42 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (construing “or” to mean
alternatives).
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 60, § 54 (2012) (“Title to the land so taken shall
thereupon vest in the town, subject to the right of redemption.”) (emphasis
added); West v. Bd. of Selectmen of Yarmouth, 188 N.E.2d 473, 474 (Mass.
1963) (recognizing that title was taken by tax collector).
See § 54.
See id. § 53 (“[T]he collector of taxes . . . may, in the name and on behalf of said
city or town, take immediate possession of such land and, until the tax title so
acquired is redeemed, collect the rent and other income from such land . . . .”).
See id. (“Upon petition of any person having a right to redeem such tax title, the
superior court for the county within which the land lies, if it adjudges justice and
the circumstances so warrant, may, upon such terms as it shall deem equitable,
enjoin a taking of possession under this section or command the surrender of a
possession taken.”).
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petition action is heard by the Superior Court.118 If rental income that
is owed to the taxpayer from the land is not collected, or if the
municipality causes any kind of injury to the property while it is in its
possession, the taxpayer has no remedy.119
In summary, a taxpayer could find title and possession gone, and
the property destroyed, all based on a tax delinquency that is claimed
but not established. The extent of the deprivation, particularly with the
almost sacred regard given real estate title,120 is clearly “serious.”121
ii. Second Infirmity: There Are Significant Chances of
Mistakes (or Worse) Being Made in the Process
Evaluating the possibility of mistake has to start with the fact that
the system is run separately in each municipality in Massachusetts,
each of which has its own capabilities and operating characteristics.122
Each municipality is responsible for the hiring, training and

118

119

120

121
122

See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1978)
(holding that the deprivation of utility services without a pre-termination hearing
violates due process).
See § 53. (“Neither said city or town nor any of its officers, agents or employees
shall be liable or accountable to the owner or to any other person having an
interest in such land for failure to collect rent or other income therefrom; and
neither said city or town nor any of its officers, agents or employees shall be
liable for injury or damage caused by the possession of land under the section to
such land or to the person or property of any person.”).
See Equator Mining & Smelting Co. v. Hall, 106 U.S. 86, 87 (1882) (describing
real estate title as “important” and “almost . . . sacred”).
See Memphis Light, 436 U.S. at 19.
There are 351 municipalities in Massachusetts, thirty-nine cities and 312 towns.
Information and Historical Data on Cities, Towns and Counties in the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, SEC’Y OF THE COMMW. OF MASS.,
https://www.sec.state.ma.us/cis/cisctlist/ctlistidx.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/2HZE-932A]. The smallest community by population is
Gosnold; the largest, not surprisingly, is Boston. See id. According to the 2010
census, Gosnold has seventy-five residents and Boston has 617,594. Id. Despite
its small size and limited amount of land, Gosnold has its own tax collector.
Telephone Interview with Lisa Wright, Town Clerk, Town of Gosnold (June 26,
2017). The current Gosnold Collector is a part-time employee of the Town. Id.
The scale of Boston’s tax collection apparatus is considerably larger. The
collection department for Boston has twenty-eight employees listed as of 2015.
See
Employee
Earnings
Report
2015,
ANALYZE
BOSTON,
https://data.boston.gov/dataset/employee-earnings-report/resource/2ff6343f850d-46e7-98d1-aca79b619fd6
(last
updated
Jan.
11,
2017)
[https://perma.cc/9ZFL-2C6W].
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supervision of its tax collector.123 This aggravates several areas of
potential mistake in the system.
First, state law imposes no minimum standards for the individuals
chosen by the municipality as its tax collector, and requires no training
before the individual assumes the tax collector’s office.124 Clearly,
there are no assurances in this process. This is particularly true in the
many smaller communities in Massachusetts, where the individual
employed may not have any experience or background in
Massachusetts real estate tax law, or even in basic accounting or
governmental operations.125 With unsupervised municipal employment
being used, it is probable that at least a few of the 351 tax collectors in
Massachusetts lack the skills needed to perform the job without
error.126 Therefore, the lack of minimum job qualifications constitutes
the first source of mistake introduced into the due process analysis.
Second, the continuing supervision of the tax collectors as they do
their jobs in the 351 communities is also problematic. The power
granted by the statute to execute and record a tax deed is given to the
tax collector directly.127 The tax collector needs no approval from any
other municipal officer or board before executing and recording a tax
deed. Further, no municipal entity has the authority under the statute to
reverse or modify the decision of the collector.128 Under the statutory
tax deed scheme, the tax collector operates without direct supervision
when a tax deed is created and used. Whether a mistake happens
because of inexperience found in a smaller town,129 or results from the
123

124
125

126

127

128
129

See § 2. In Gosnold, the Tax Collector works with the Town’s Manager. See
Telephone Interview with Lisa Wright, supra note 122. In Boston, the data
reveal a typical government bureaucracy based on the job titles in the database.
See Employee Earnings Report 2015, supra note 122.
See § 2.
In Gosnold, the elected Treasurer was also appointed Tax Collector. Telephone
Interview with Lisa Wright, supra note 122. She is paid as a part-time employee
in the role. Id. Professionally, she is a teacher on Martha’s Vineyard. Id.
There have been challenges raised in the Land Court to a tax deed redemption
foreclosure on the grounds of a mistake made in the calculation of the tax owed.
Interview with Deborah J. Patterson, supra note 41.
See § 53 (“[T]he collector may take such land for the town . . . .”) (emphasis
added).
See id. Similarly, no judicial entity has the express power to undue a tax deed.
In Gosnold, for example, the part-time Tax Collector has not had any experience
with tax deeds. See Telephone Interview with Lisa Wright, supra note 122
(indicating that the Town of Gosnold has not executed a tax deed for at least
fifteen years). If Gosnold now needs to collect a real estate tax debt, the Tax
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inflexibility found in the entrenched bureaucracy that comprises a
major municipality’s tax collection operation,130 significant errors are
likely. Even the software used may be untrustworthy.131
Third, employee fraud does occur at the municipal level both
within and without the tax collection department.132 Equally, tax
collectors soliciting bribes or engaging in other misconduct to affect a
taxpayer’s taxes has occurred.133 Consequently, although apparently
fairly rare, tax collector criminal malfeasance is another source of
potential error.
In summary, the process of collecting taxes on the thousands of
real estate parcels in arrears within the Commonwealth is a
complicated enough bureaucratic activity that occasional problems
will occur. These problems could be as simple as the tax collector’s

130

131

132

133

Collector would be entering territory that has not been explored by anyone in the
Town in a decade and a half.
It seems highly unlikely that Boston’s Tax Collector drafts tax deeds; instead,
the bureaucracy that reports to the Collector is likely to draft the documents in
the ordinary course of business of the department and present them to the
Collector for signature.
See Lauren Feiner, Over 2,000 Massachusetts Taxpayers Billed Incorrectly Due
to
Software
Error,
BOSTON
GLOBE
(July
26,
2017),
http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2017/07/26/over-massachusettstaxpayers-billed-incorrectly-due-softwareerror/bDzfCKwXeomzV6uVhfsgDJ/story.html [https://perma.cc/5ABQ-T3V3].
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Canon, 368 N.E.2d 1181, 1182 (Mass. 1977); see
also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 268A, §§ 2–3, 17–21B (2012); see generally Brian
C. Mooney, Probe Targets Excise Collection, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 5, 1995, at
(Metro) 1,1995 WLNR 2136957 (“One reason is that deputies—often appointed
by local tax collectors on the basis of personal, political or family connections—
surface with embarrassing regularity in embezzlement, tax or other corruption
cases.”); Ex-tax Collector to Forfeit Funds, MASS. LAW. WKLY., Nov. 30, 2017,
at 3 (reporting restitution after tax collector embezzlement).
See Finnegan v. United States, 204 F.2d 105, 108 (8th Cir. 1953) (upholding
conviction for conflict of interest where an IRS collector represented a taxpayer
before the agency); Commonwealth v. Goldbard, 419 A.2d 161, 162-64 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1980) (upholding conviction for bribery where a tax collector
solicited a bribe so that taxpayer would not have to pay tax). Cf. Coleman v.
State ex rel. Mitchell, 182 So. 627, 629 (Fla. 1938) (finding that a deputy tax
collector could not be convicted of soliciting a bribe under the Florida statute as
the statute did not include deputy tax collectors). See generally MacLean v.
Delinsky, 556 N.E.2d 60, 61-63 (Mass. 1990) (describing some of the factual
background of the Barczak matter); Businessmen Say Barczak Acted on Own,
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 20, 1983 (reporting on a scheme by a Massachusetts
revenue officer to solicit bribes so that a business’s tax problems could be
resolved for significantly less money than was owed).
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office crediting a received payment to the wrong property to as
complex as a criminal scheme to enrich a member of the tax
collector’s office. Of course, with 351 separately operated tax
collection operations, the risk of error multiplies because of the
operational inexperience introduced, particularly in the smaller towns.
In any case, the pre-seizure decision-making is not completely
reliable.134
This is particularly true with tax deeds because the law has no
option for the taxpayer to challenge the determination that taxes are
owed before title to the property is removed. If a tax collector demands
a payment that the taxpayer asserts is not owed, the taxpayer has no
way to challenge the order. If the demand is not met, the real estate is
taken; if it is met, the taxpayer’s money is taken. Either way, the
taxpayer is deprived of his or her property without due process.
3. Exception Two Fails: No Exigent Circumstances Require
Action Before a Hearing
In the early 1990s, the Supreme Court decided Connecticut v.
Doehr.135 The case reviewed the prejudgment attachment procedure
authorized by Connecticut law in civil suits that allowed a security
interest to be obtained against the real estate of a defendant without
requiring pre-seizure notice and a judicial hearing.136 The court, in
striking down the Connecticut provision, held that:
[p]ermitting a court to authorize attachment merely
because the plaintiff believes the defendant is liable, or
because the plaintiff can make out a facially valid
complaint, would permit the deprivation of the
defendant’s property when the claim would fail to
convince [the ultimate fact-finder], when it rested on
factual allegations that were sufficient to state a cause
of action but which the defendant would dispute, or in
the case of a mere good-faith standard, even when the
134
135
136

See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 19 (1978).
Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1 (1991).
See id. at 4. The original plaintiff in the Connecticut state suit in Doehr was
John F. DiGiovanni who had obtained a pre-trial, ex parte attachment of the
defendant, Brian K. Doehr’s home in Meriden, Connecticut. See id. at 5.
DiGiovanni obtained the attachment as part of his suit against Doehr seeking
recovery for an alleged assault and battery. See id. Doehr brought an
independent suit in federal court challenging the constitutionality of the
attachment process. See id. at 7.
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complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. The potential for unwarranted
attachment in these situations is self-evident and too
great to satisfy the requirements of due process absent
any countervailing consideration.137
As the Connecticut attachment process struck down in Doehr has
many similarities to the procedure authorized by Massachusetts tax
deeds, the case instructs well on the inappropriateness of the tax deed
process that does not require a hearing and makes no showing of a
“countervailing consideration” of exigent circumstances to justify its
lack.138
Under the Connecticut procedures in Doehr, a prejudgment real
estate attachment could be obtained by the plaintiff based on an
affidavit submitted to a judge for review.139 The judge was to evaluate
the affidavit to determine if there was “probable cause to sustain the
validity of the plaintiff’s claims . . . .”140 The defendant was not given
notice that the plaintiff was seeking an attachment nor was any hearing
required before the attachment was authorized.141 Only after the
attachment was recorded, which served to encumber the defendant’s
real estate, was the defendant notified of the suit and attachment.142
Although the Connecticut procedures did not provide a pre-seizure
notice or hearing, the statute did give the defendant an immediate postseizure right to challenge the attachment as lacking in probable
cause.143 If a challenge to the attachment’s validity was filed, the court
was required to conduct a prompt hearing (within seven business days)
on its validity.144

137
138
139

140

141
142
143

144

Id. at 13-14.
See id. at 14.
See id. at 5-6. Doehr involved a claim in tort, but the statute under attack was
available for all civil actions and it was struck down on a facial attack rather
than an as-applied challenge. See id. at 5; see also Pinsky v. Duncan, 898 F.2d
852, 858 (2d Cir. 1990), aff’d sub nom., 501 U.S. 1 (1991).
Doehr, 501 U.S. at 5 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-278(e) (1991) (amended
1993)).
See id.
See id. at 7.
See id. The defendant could also petition to replace the property attached with an
alternate object or with a bond.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-278(e).

302

UMass Law Review

v. 13 | 274

As with the Connecticut procedure, a Massachusetts tax deed
effectuates a taking of the defendant’s property without a hearing,145
but the property deprivation is more extreme and the procedural
safeguards are lower. Under the procedure, while the statute does
require the taxpayer to be notified that a taking is imminent,146 no
hearing, indeed no judicial review, is required.147 The tax collector,
strictly on his or her own decision, takes title to the property. Also,
unlike the less extreme Connecticut attachment procedure found
deficient in Doehr, the Massachusetts statute provides no way to
challenge the validity of the taking even after it is effectuated.148 In
other words, based solely on the unreviewed decision of a
municipality’s tax collector, the taxpayer’s land is taken with no
mechanism provided to challenge the validity of the taking.149 Most
145

146

147

148

149

See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 60, § 53 (2012) (“If a tax on land is not paid within
fourteen days after demand therefor and remains unpaid at the date of taking, the
collector may take such land for the town . . . .”).
See id. (“[T]he collector . . . [must] first giv[e] fourteen days’ notice of his
intention to exercise such power of taking . . . .”).
See id. (“[T]he collector may take such land for the town . . . .”) (emphasis
added).
See id. The only grant of power to the courts in the statute deal with the
possession of the real estate, not title to it. See id. (“Upon petition of any person
having a right to redeem such tax title, the superior court for the county within
which the land lies, if it adjudges justice and the circumstances so warrant, may,
upon such terms as it shall deem equitable, enjoin a taking of possession under
this section or command the surrender of a possession taken.”). The statute does
not grant the court the power to return title to the taxpayer. The authority of the
Land Court in the foreclosure of the redemption suit seems likewise
circumspect. The taxpayer is allowed to seek to redeem the property but only for
the amount fixed by the court. See id. § 68. The court is not authorized to
evaluate the legality of the taking itself. See id.
There are at least two possible non-statutory remedies available to a taxpayer to
attempt to recover title to the property, neither of which may prove adequate.
First, should the tax collector choose to foreclose the right of redemption
associated with the tax deed, the taxpayer will be heard about the amount that is
owed, but most other challenges to the tax assessment will not be cognizable by
the court. See Howard v. Dunster, 120 N.E. 849, 849 (Mass. 1918) (“[I]t is only
when the tax is wholly without validity that it can be disputed by way of defense
to an action to recover the tax . . . .”). Second, a Massachusetts court may have
sufficient general equitable powers to order a tax collector to return the real
estate to the taxpayer, see, e.g., Johnson v. Superintendent, Mass. St. Police, 624
N.E.2d 542, 544 (Mass. 1993), but many grounds for the challenge to the tax
deed title may have already been waived, see, e.g., Tax Collector of Braintree v.
J.G. Grant & Sons, Inc., 532 N.E.2d 79, 81-82 (Mass. App. 1989). As the
Supreme Judicial Court stated in Sydney v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation,
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significantly, the tax deed does not assert a security interest as was
done by the Connecticut procedure; instead, fee simple title is taken.150
Should the tax collector choose, the taxpayer can be ousted
immediately and the town can take possession of the property.151 All
of this can occur without any judicial review.
As discussed in more depth above,152 there are some systematic
problems in the structure of the Massachusetts real estate tax collection
apparatus that raise the possibility of an error occurring. Of all of the
possible mistakes described, the most common is likely to be the
misdirection of a payment. Consider this hypothetical:
A taxpayer comes into town hall to make a real estate
tax payment. The tax collector mistakenly credits the
payment to another taxpayer’s account. Subsequently,
when the taxpayer’s account is flagged as delinquent,
the tax collector sends notice that the property will be
taken by tax deed. The taxpayer goes to town hall to
object, but cannot convince the tax collector that a
mistake has been made. The tax collector executes and
records the tax deed and takes title to the real estate.
The kind of mistake highlighted in the hypothetical is exactly the
kind of mistake that can be corrected with a hearing before a taking is
done. Correcting the mistake after the fact is not sufficient,153

150

151
152
153

356 N.E.2d 460, 463 (Mass. 1976), “Unless the administrative remedy is
‘seriously inadequate’ under all the conditions of the case, it should not be
displaced by an action for a declaration . . . and care must be taken lest
allowance of a judicial substitute disrupt unduly the orderly collection of tax.”
The conclusion is that challenging the title transferred to the municipality by a
tax deed will be daunting, at best, and impossible, at worst.
Compare Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 11 (1991) (describing the security
interest provided by the Connecticut procedure), with MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 60,
§ 53 (authorizing the tax collector to take both “title” and “possession”).
See § 53.
See supra Section IV.B.2.b.
See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972) (“The Fourteenth Amendment
draws no bright lines around three-day, 10-day or 50-day deprivations of
property. Any significant taking of property by the State is within the purview of
the Due Process Clause. While the length and consequent severity of a
deprivation may be another factor to weigh in determining the appropriate form
of hearing, it is not decisive of the basic right to a prior hearing of some kind.”).
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particularly considering the high penalties imposed on a taxpayer who
redeems the property after the taking.154
This demonstrates that the exigency existing in the appropriation
of real estate title by a tax deed is significantly lower than that of a
Connecticut attachment; in fact, it barely exists. Taxes assessed against
real estate in Massachusetts automatically become a lien on the real
estate making the municipality a secured creditor of the taxpayer.155
Even if there is a sale of the real estate against which taxes are owed,
the subsequent owner consequently takes title subject to the taxes.156
This stands in stark contrast to the attachment process in Doehr as,
without the attachment, a defendant is free to convey the property
without concern for any desire the plaintiff may have to use it to
satisfy the debt. The net result is that a municipality in Massachusetts
has no exigency to justify taking the taxpayer’s property without a
hearing.
4. Conclusion
Even recognizing that “[t]he formality and procedural requisites
for the hearing can vary, depending upon the importance of the
interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings,”157
Massachusetts tax deeds procedurally fail as they allow the
municipality to take the taxpayer’s property without providing a preseizure hearing; indeed, no procedure is provided for the taxpayer to
obtain an immediate post-seizure hearing. As no exigency justifies this
lack, the tax deed is procedurally deficient under the Due Process
Clause.

154

155
156

157

See §§ 15 & 55. The interest charges are particularly onerous. See id; see also
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 59, § 57 (2007) (imposing a fourteen percent rate from
nonpayment to taking); ch. 60, § 62 (imposing a sixteen percent rate from the
taking to the foreclosure of the redemption); see also Tallage LLC v. Meaney,
2015 WL 4207424, at *2, 23 LCR (Landlaw) 375 (Mass. Land Ct. 2015).
See ch. 60, § 37.
See City of Boston v. Quincy Mkt. Cold Storage & Warehouse Co., 45 N.E.2d
959, 964 (Mass. 1942) (“The real estate of the owner in fact is charged with a
lien for the payment of the tax thereon irrespective of the person to whom the
tax is assessed, though the person to whom it is assessed is primarily liable
therefor.”); Hanna v. Town of Framingham, 802 N.E.2d 1061, 1066 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2004) (“[T]he town’s lien securing payment of real estate taxes arises
automatically.”).
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971).
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V. CONCLUSION
Massachusetts tax deeds fail federal and state due process scrutiny
for two reasons. First, they allow the municipalities to keep property
that is significantly beyond the amount for which they have a claim.
Second, they allow a municipality to take title from the taxpayer
without providing a pre-seizure hearing. Neither problem is acceptable
under constitutional analysis.
Because of the seriousness of the problem, tax deeds under
Chapter 60 of the General Laws should no longer be recognized;
instead, one of the alternate methods of tax collection should be
required. When presented with a tax deed or the foreclosure of the
right of redemption flowing from them, the courts should refuse to
enforce them as they violate the taxpayer’s due process rights and
should declare that they are not sufficient to convey title from the
taxpayer to the municipality. Whether a party who has received title
via a tax deed has obtained a valid interest or whether a Section 1983
action is appropriate to recover for the due process violations that have
already occurred is left for evaluation by the affected parties and their
counsel.

